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Abstract 
This paper analyses the cost implications for climate policy in developed countries if developing 
countries are unwilling to adopt measures to reduce their own GHG emissions. First, we assume that a 
450 CO2 (550 CO2e) ppmv stabilisation target is to be achieved and that Non Annex1 (NA1) 
countries decide to delay their GHG emission reductions by 30 years. What would be the cost 
difference between this scenario and a case in which both developed and developing countries start 
reducing their emissions at the same time? Then, we look at a scenario in which the timing of 
developing countries’ participation is uncertain and again we compute the costs of climate policy in 
developed and developing countries. We find that delayed participation of NA1 countries has a 
negative impact on climate policy costs. Economic inefficiencies can be as large as 10-25 TlnUSD. 
However, this additional cost wanes when developing countries are allowed to trade emission 
reductions from their baseline emission paths during the 30-year delay period. Thus, irrespective of 
whether NA1 countries are immediately assigned an emission reduction target or not, they should 
nonetheless be included in a global carbon market. Technology deployment is also affected by the 
timing of developing countries’ mitigation measures. Delayed NA1-country participation in a climate 
agreement would scale down the deployment of coal with CCS throughout the century. On the other 
hand, innovation in the form of energy R&D investments would be positively affected, since it would 
become crucial in developed countries. Finally, uncertainty about the timing of NA1-country 
participation does not modify the optimal abatement strategy for developed countries and does not 
alter policy costs as long as a global carbon market is in place. 
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The Bali Action Plan reaffirms the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, thus emphasizing the different 
roles that Annex 1 (A1) and non Annex 1 (NA1) countries will play in an 
international climate agreement. When and how NA1 countries will 
participate in an international climate agreement, however, is still extremely 
uncertain.  
The reasons why progress towards a global agreement on GHG 
emission control is slow relate mainly to differences in countries’ historical 
responsibilities, mitigation potentials and climate change vulnerabilities. In 
particular, developing countries are more vulnerable to extensive damages 
from climate change, while bearing little historical responsibilities. Another 
reason that discourages NA1 countries’ participation to a binding mitigation 
agreement is the extremely unequal distribution of emissions per capita 
around the world. This gives rise to an equity-based argument for 
postponing any emission-curbing action in NA1 countries. Unwilling to 
control their GHG emissions, NA1 countries are providing A1 countries 
with one of the most frequently used motives for postponing abatement: 
alone, A1 countries cannot do much to stabilise GHG concentrations given 
the growing international weight of developing countries’ economic 
activities. 
Although hard to achieve, an international agreement aiming at 
stabilising the atmospheric concentration of CO2 at about 450 ppm has been 
foreseen by the scientific community as the only way to limit the increase in 
the average global temperature to within about two degrees. The economic 
cost of such a stringent target is usually computed by assuming the 
immediate participation of all countries to a global agreement. This is, for 2 
 
example, the assumption underlying the estimates of climate policy costs as 
reported in the IPCC 4ar. There are just a few recent exceptions (Cf. 
Edmonds et al., 2007; Keppa and Rao, 2007) but they all concentrate on a 
first best analysis where incentives for countries to free ride are not taken 
into account.
1 In addition, these papers do not model a carbon-tradable 
permit system, nor do they take into account uncertainty affecting the 
participation of different countries. 
This paper aims at filling this gap by investigating the implications 
of delays and uncertainties in developing countries’ participation in a 
climate agreement designed to achieve a stringent GHG stabilization target. 
We provide insights in terms of mitigation strategies and economic costs, 
with a particular focus on the implications for the design of an international 
emission trading scheme. The analysis is carried out using WITCH, a hybrid 
climate-economy model of 12 world regions in which energy technologies 
are carefully modelled. A detailed description of WITCH is to be found in 
Bosetti et al. (2006)
 2. The regional structure of the model allows us to 
analyze different timing of NA1 countries’ participation to an international 
climate agreement.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the debate 
on developing countries’ delayed participation, whereas Section 3 describes 
the model optimisation experiments. Effects of delayed participation on 
GHG abatement, policy costs and the deployment of different technologies 
are discussed in Section 4, 5 and 6, respectively. Section 7 contains an 
analysis of the cost of delayed participation when the timing of participation 
is uncertain. Some concluding remarks and scope for further research are 




                                                 
1 Either a central planner is assumed or the economic cost is the output of a fully 
cooperative equilibrium.  
2 See also  www.feem-web.it/WITCH 3 
 
2. Stabilisation targets with immediate and delayed participation of 
developing regions. 
The economic cost of any stabilisation target crucially depends on the 
reference scenario. In this paper, the reference scenario is obtained by 
computing the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium of the game between the 
12 regions of the world that are modelled in WITCH in the absence of any 
international climate policy. In the reference scenario, free-riding 
behaviours are accounted for, along with incentives to reduce GHG 
emissions deriving from perceived domestic damages.  
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium world carbon emissions from 2005 to 
2100 in our BaU scenario. Emissions are projected to grow throughout the 
century, though at a decreasing rate in the second half, to reach about 21 
GtC by 2100. Figure 1 also shows the equilibrium emissions when the 
constraint that GHG concentrations must be stabilised at 450 ppm (CO2 
only) is introduced. Stabilising CO2 concentrations at 450 ppm (or, 
equivalently, at a radiative forcing of all GHGs equal to 3.5 W/m^2) would 
require drastic mitigation efforts, with no emission overshooting and 
eventually stabilisation at about 2-3 GtC per year in the second half of the 
century.  
The global mitigation effort, i.e. the difference between the reference 
and the stabilisation emission profile, is shown in red in Figure 1. Such an 
effort can be shared among world regions according to different burden-
sharing rules. In our analysis, we assume a “contraction and convergence” 
scheme, which implies that allowances are initially allocated on the basis of 
present emissions, but converge to an equal per capita emissions allocation 
by 2050. The implied abatement objectives and consequent shares of 
allowances for A1 and NA1 countries are shown in Figure 2. A1 countries 
face a higher initial abatement effort (left panel). Over time, NA1 countries 
take the lead as their share of emissions increases. In terms of the emission 
target (right panel), this translates into a gradually decreasing target for A1 
countries and into a roughly constant one for NA1 countries. However, 4 
 
developing countries might argue that a steady target set around 2005 levels 
is not compatible with the fast development of their economic systems. This 
leads us to investigate the implications of a possible delay in NA1 countries’ 
participation. 
 
Figure 1. Global BaU and stabilisation emission profiles (2002-2102) 























Figure 2 – Abatement and allocated emissions in the immediate 






























































Let us assume that developing countries join a climate coalition for 
the first time in 2035. From this date, a global cap and trade scheme is 5 
 
implemented. Before 2035, a cap and trade climate policy is operational 
only in A1 countries. The effect of NA1 countries participating from 2035 is 
shown in Figure 3. Obviously, A1 countries bear the whole mitigation effort 
until NA1 countries join (left panel). Given the growing share of developing 
countries’ emissions, the target A1 countries face tightens very rapidly, to 
almost zero emissions in only 30 years (right panel). 


















































Figure 3 shows the increasing relevance of NA1 countries’ emissions 
and the major consequences that their delay would have on the rest of the 
world. NA1 countries must join not later than 30 years from now, if A1 
countries are not to face negative emission targets! However, as we will 
argue in the next sections, the situation could be improved, i.e. the delay 
period could be prolonged, if non-participatory countries are allowed to sell 
their emission reductions (with respect to their BaU emission paths) to A1 
countries. 
  
3. Climate policy scenarios 
Let us provide a detailed analysis of the implications of different climate 
policy scenarios on the cost of climate policy, on actual GHG emissions and 
on energy investment strategies in different regions of the world. As we 
have said, in all policy scenarios world emissions are assumed to be 
constrained to follow a path consistent with stabilisation of CO2 
concentrations at 450 ppm by 2100, or equivalently at a 3.5 W/m^2 6 
 
radiative forcing including all GHG gases.
3 This global emission target is 
shared via a “contraction and convergence” allocation rule for A1 countries 
before 2035, and for all countries afterwards. In one scenario (see below), 
NA1 countries participate in the global carbon market without binding 
commitments before 2035, and in this period they are thus allocated their 
BaU emissions.
4 International carbon trading is modelled via an iterative 
algorithm that mimics a process of tâtonnement for a perfect market. We 
thus assume zero transaction costs, a hypothesis justified by the large 
volume of carbon trading. 
Banking is permitted in order to allow participatory countries to vary 
their emissions in response to other countries’ delay in participation while 
respecting the global cap. We do not allow borrowing and speculative 
behaviour which is in line with the Kyoto protocol rules. Using WITCH, we 
compare the case of immediate participation versus a set of cases with 
delayed participation. These cases can be described as follows: 
-  entry now: all countries participate to the international climate 
agreement from the beginning. 
-  entry 2035: NA1 countries join the climate coalitions in 2035.
5 A1 
countries bear all the mitigation effort before then, with the resulting 
target shown in Figure 3. We distinguish between two sub cases: 
o  w/out trade: carbon trading is permitted only among 
participatory countries. And again we distinguish between 
two sub-cases:  
  in the first one, NA1 countries cannot anticipate that 
they will agree on a stabilization target from 2035 
onward, Therefore, all their choice variables are fixed 
                                                 
3 Choosing looser climate targets would make the analysis less interesting because of the 
higher possibility of moving emissions across the century. 
4 We also considered other burden sharing schemes such as “equal per capita” and 
“sovereignty” to explore a wide range of plausible allocations. We found that results are 
robust across schemes, and thus only the “contraction and convergence” case is presented 
here. 
5 Earlier and later participation dates were also analysed, with consistent results. 7 
 
at the BAU levels from 2005 to 2035. We call this 
case w/out trade myopic. 
  in the second one, NA1 countries set their policy 
strategy from 2005 to 2035 taking into account that 
they will participate in a climate agreement aiming at 
stabilizing emissions at 450 ppm from 2035 onward. 
We call this case w/out trade. 
o  with trade: before 2035, NA1 can trade emission reductions 
from their baseline emission paths even though they do not 
participate to the climate policy agreement. 
A final experiment is performed to analyse the case in which the 
timing of participation is uncertain. We assume that NA1 countries will join 
the climate coalition in 2035 with 50% probability and in 2050 with the 
residual probability. This stochastic  case is implemented using the 
stochastic programming version of the WITCH model (see Bosetti and 
Tavoni, 2007 for a detailed description). 
 
4. Implications of developing countries’ delayed participation for global 
GHG emissions 
We start by analysing the environmental implications of developing 
countries delaying their accession to a climate agreement. The left panel of 
Figure 4 shows fossil fuel emissions. Delayed participation with trade 
restricted to participatory countries induces higher global emissions before 
global accession. This means that lost abatement from NA1 countries is not 
totally compensated by A1 countries’ extra effort, because of the very 
stringent target A1 countries are confronted with.  
Even though the stringency of the overall target limits the 
postponement of abatement, up to 2 GtC/yr of abated emissions shift from 
the first period (before 2035) to the second one; i.e. they are added to the 
already large abatement effort that must be carried out in the second part of 8 
 
the century (not shown in the graphs). This postponed abatement is 
especially evident in the case in which NA1 countries do not anticipate their 
forthcoming climate obligation (w/out trade myopic case), and thus do not 
undertake measures to reduce emissions below their baselines. If instead 
they start reducing emissions before 2035 (because it is cost effective from 
their own unilateral and intertemporal viewpoint and not because they sign a 
climate agreement), extra emissions are significantly less (w/out trade case).  
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When NA1 countries are allowed to participate in the carbon market 
even before 2035 (with trade case), emissions are brought back to 
essentially the same levels as the immediate participation case. The negative 
environmental implications of delayed NA1-country participation is thus 
offset by the existence of a global carbon market (in which NA1 countries 
are allocated their BAU emission levels). This is confirmed in the right 
panel of Figure 4, which reports the evolution of atmospheric carbon 
concentrations over the century. Limiting trading induces an increase in 
concentrations from 2020 onwards. This has important implications also for 
the deployment of low carbon technologies, as explained in Section 6. 
A closer inspection of NA1 countries’ emissions reveals an 
interesting result. As already mentioned, the WITCH model features a game 
theoretical set up in which regions choose their investments strategically, by 9 
 
taking all other regions’ behaviour into account. When A1 countries 
participate in a climate agreement, they have an impact on global emissions 
which is ultimately taken into account by NA1 regions. This interaction 
occurs via different channels. First, a stringent climate policy lowers 
consumption and thus prices of exhaustible resources such as fossil fuels. 
Accordingly, countries not involved in a climate agreement have access to 
cheaper resources and have the incentive to increase their emissions with 
respect to the case in which there is no agreement. On the other hand, A1 
countries’ commitment to a climate policy fosters technical change in low 
carbon technologies, thus decreasing their prices and making them 
economically attractive also in developing countries. Finally, given the 
perfect foresight nature of the model, A1 and NA1 countries foresee the 
eventual (after 2035) target and accordingly adjust their investment choices 
given the low capital turnover of energy investments. 
Figure 5 shows how the two latter forces prevail in our setting. When 
NA1 countries are not allowed to trade emission permits, they nonetheless 
emit less than they would do in a BaU scenario (which is equivalent to the 
myopic case before 2035). The argument of inertia of investments especially 
motivates an anticipatory behaviour in developing countries, although this is 
significant only after 2020. 
  More decisive and immediate action to reduce emissions can be 
observed when NA1 countries are allowed to sell emission reductions from 
their baseline in the carbon market (see Figure 5 again). In this case, 
emissions grow at a much lower rate because NA1 countries benefit from 
selling allowances and A1 countries reduce emissions in NA 1 regions 



























5. Implications of developing countries’ delayed participation on 
climate policy costs 
Let us now turn to the economic implications of delayed NA1-country 
participation. Figure 6 shows the effects on international carbon prices. 
Prices increase very significantly without NA1 countries’ participation, 
roughly three times compared to the full participation case, to over 1500$/tC 
(400 $/tCO2) just before NA1 countries join the coalition. This follows on 
from the fact that the A1 countries’ target becomes very severe, as shown in 
Figure 3. In the myopic case, where NA1 countries do not anticipate their 
future emission reduction targets, prices remain higher even after they join 
the agreement, given the inefficient energy infrastructure that would have 
been built and that would make it harder for NA1 countries to reach their 
own target. 
Granting non-participatory countries access to the carbon market 
brings international carbon prices down to the values that would emerge in 
the immediate participation case, as the carbon trading instrument tends to 
equalize marginal abatement costs across regions. Prices remain slightly 
higher in the first part of the century, and lower thereafter (not shown in 
Figure 6); this is a consequence of the banking option that allows the 11 
 
intertemporal transfer of carbon rights, which implies that the amount of 
emissions in each time period is not independent of the distribution of 
permits.
6 However, as the graph shows, this effect is very limited when 
compared to the effect of carbon trading restrictions. 






















Table 1 shows the economic cost of achieving the 450 ppm target in 
the various policy scenarios. Costs are expressed as net present value of 
future world GDP losses using a 5% discount rate. 
Table 1. Policy costs across scenarios 
NPV GDP loss 
2000-2100 
WORLD  A1  NA1 
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6 The analysis of the effect of banking on the implications of climate policy under different 
allocation schemes is contained in Bosetti, Carraro and Massetti (2008). 12 
 
 
Achieving the 450 ppm stabilization target in the base case of 
immediate participation will imply a 2.1% loss of world GDP. Delaying 
NA1 countries’ participation would negatively affect the cost of climate 
policy, by 2.8% and 3.7% depending on whether NA1 countries anticipate 
their future target or not. That is, we value the inefficiency of constraining 
“where-when” flexibilities in the range of 11-25 trillion 1995USD.  
However, this extra cost cancels out when a global carbon market is 
introduced before 2035. Global costs are brought back to around 2%, and 
we actually observe slightly lower costs in this case. This derives from the 
fact that the very stringent target for A1 countries creates an incentive to 
make larger investments in energy-related R&D and in carbon-free 
technology, which then creates a positive intertemporal spillover effect.  
Looking at the regional distribution of the policy costs, the 
contraction and convergence scheme in the full participation case entails 
higher economic losses for NA1 countries (2.8%) than for A1 countries 
(1.7%). If NA1 countries delay their participation, A1 countries face a 
notable increase in cost, to around 3% of GDP when NA1 countries are 
outside the global carbon market. This is equivalent to an extra economic 
loss for A1 countries of approximately 13 trillion USD; however, this cost 
could be significantly cut down (by 10 trillion) if NA1 countries were 
allowed to trade from their baseline emissions before 2035. NA1 countries 
face slightly lower costs (1.6 trillion) when they defer their involvement, but 
they are drastically higher (10 trillion) when they behave myopically by 
following their BaU emission path for 30 years, and subsequently commit to 
emissions reductions.  
A carbon market in which all regions trade before 2035 has the 
implication of partitioning global policy costs into two equal portions: both 
A1 and NA1 countries would pay 2% of their GDP to achieve the climate 
target. A1 countries’ transfers to NA1 countries increase by 3 trillion, but 13 
 
that avoids a 13.9 trillion loss to achieve the same climate objective by 
means of autarkic measures. 
 
6.   Implications of developing countries’ delayed participation on 
energy technology   
 
One might wonder about the implications of developing countries’ delayed 
participation  for the deployment of abatement technologies. Developing 
countries are believed to host a substantial number of cheap mitigation 
options which arise from high energy intensities and capital replacement as 
a result of rapidly expanding economies. On the other hand, developed 
countries possess a more-than-proportional share of the human capital and 
research infrastructure that are needed for the technological innovation that 
is often advocated as the key to the decoupling of mitigation and economy. 
Figure 7 shows the penetration of two important abatement options 
in the energy sector: power generation with coal and CCS (left panel) and 
energy efficiency enhancing research and development (right panel). 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is considered to be one of the 
crucial low carbon technologies, because it would allow the world to 
continue to use affordable fossil fuels and at the same time reduce carbon 
emissions. Therefore, it is expected to play an important role, especially in 
countries that heavily rely on coal for generating energy, such as China and 
India for example, which are among NA1 countries. Postponing their 
participation in a climate agreement along with excluding them from the 
carbon market would reduce the diffusion of CCS significantly, as reported 
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After NA1 countries join the coalition in 2035, CCS would revive; 
interestingly enough, however, both its growth rate and maximum 
penetration would be jeopardized throughout the whole century. The reason 
for this downscaling can be attributed to the fact that CCS does not 
completely offset carbon emissions. In line with the engineering literature, 
we assume that only 90% of carbon can be captured and injected, and that 
the remaining 10% is vented. This imperfect abatement rate is penalising if 
mitigation targets are very severe, in which case virtually carbon free 
technologies such as renewable energy and nuclear power are preferred. 
This is exactly what happens when NA1 countries delay their participation 
and cannot trade permits, and part of the abatement effort is shifted to the 
second half of the century
7.  
A contrasting picture emerges when we look at investments in 
energy innovation (Figure 7, right). Delayed participation and no carbon 
trading results in higher investments in energy efficiency R&D, since A1 
countries’ tight emission target must be achieved through innovation 
measures, given the limited availability of mitigation options in currently 
used technologies. This more ‘innovation-centred’ investment behaviour 
persists even after NA1 countries join the coalition, because of the positive 
intertemporal spillover from R&D activity (“standing on shoulder”) that is 
                                                 
7 Improving the carbon capture rate (through dedicated investments) could alleviate this 
effect. On the other hand, potential leakage from the reservoirs (assumed to be zero in our 
simulations) would exacerbate it. 15 
 
accounted for in our framework.
8 It’s worth noting that allowing for a global 
carbon market even before 2035 implies the same path of technology 
adoption as in the case of immediate participation, in line with the findings 
of the previous section.  
 
7. Effects of uncertainty on the timing of participation 
As a final experiment, we move from a deterministic to a stochastic context 
by introducing uncertainty about the timing of NA1 countries’ participation. 
The date of their participation in a binding climate agreement is clearly very 
indeterminate and the resulting uncertainty has important implications for 
short-term investment strategies and policy measures. 
We employ a stochastic programming version of the WITCH model, 
framing the analysis on a scenario tree, solving for all scenarios 
simultaneously and accounting for non-anticipativity constraints (action has 
to be the same for different scenarios before the disclosure of uncertainty in 
2035, while the optimal reaction to the information revealed when 
uncertainty is eliminated is allowed afterwards). This formulation enables us 
to devise the optimal strategy before uncertainty is disclosed, and identify 
potentially optimal hedging behaviour. It also enables us to determine the 
most suitable portfolio of mitigation technologies given the uncertainty 
about the timing of NA1-country participation.
9 
We assume the probability distribution of participation time for NA1 
countries to be as follows: with 50% probability they will join the climate 
coalition in 2035, and with the remaining 50% probability they will do so in 
2050. We analyse only the case in which NA1 countries are allowed to trade 
permits before 2035. If they are not - as shown in Section 2 - A1 countries 
alone would not be able to bear the whole mitigation effort after 2035 
(unless we allow for the possibility of achieving negative emissions). 
                                                 
8 Interregional spillovers are not modelled here, since they would have a limited impact on 
the results (see Bosetti et al. 2007a). 
9 The stochastic version of WITCH has already been used to analyse the effects of 
uncertainty about the effectiveness of energy R&D investments (see Bosetti and Tavoni, 
2008). 16 
 
Let us focus on the equilibrium strategy before uncertainty is 
resolved in 2035. Figure 8 shows global carbon emissions in the 
deterministic and stochastic cases. The stochastic path (in brown) is very 
similar to the deterministic one with participation of NA1 countries in 2035. 
The stochastic equilibrium strategy (the hedging strategy) overlaps the 
deterministic strategy when NA1 countries are supposed to sign a binding 
climate agreement in 2035, but allowed to trade from their BAU before 
2035. Similarly, the global cost of climate policy and the adoption (timing 
and size of investments) of mitigation technologies in the stochastic case are 
very similar to the deterministic one if NA1 countries are allowed to trade 
from their BAU before 2035.
10 As long as a global carbon market is in 
place, uncertainty over NA1-country participation (which may occur in 
2050 rather than in 2035) does not affect the optimal strategies of A1 
countries.  
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However, if emissions in developing countries remain unabated for 
more than 30 years from now - either because they do not accept any 
binding commitment and/or because a global permit market is not 
established - then the 450 ppm stabilization target becomes unattainable. 
                                                 
10 These results are available upon request. 17 
 
8. Conclusions 
If the world is serious about fighting global warming, scientific evidence 
indicates that stringent stabilization of carbon concentrations is needed by 
the end of the century. Setting a 450 ppm CO2 only (550 all GHGs) target 
requires that emissions are severely reduced from their baseline level. More 
than a thousand fossil-fuel-generated GtC would need to be abated 
throughout the century with respect to our projected baseline, three times 
total industrial emissions released into the atmosphere since 1750. This will 
require a substantial change of today’s use of energy in industrialised 
countries. Beyond 2050, per capita emissions will need to be lowered to 0.3 
tC/cap per year. This represents today’s per capita emissions in India, which 
is only 1/10
th and 1/15
th of average EU and US per capita emissions 
respectively. 
Such a difficult task requires global participation in a cooperative 
effort to control GHG emissions, and it will not be possible without 
cooperation from developing countries. The timing of these countries’ 
participation to an international climate agreement, however, is at present 
very uncertain and likely to be effective only years, if not decades, from 
now. This consideration is often used to support the argument that emission 
abatement restricted to developed countries would be ineffective, given the 
growing CO2 emissions of developing countries. Yet, when computing the 
economic cost of achieving a given stabilization target (as for example in 
the IPCC4AR 2007), model experiments have traditionally assumed perfect 
“when”/”where” flexibilities in allocating the global effort in time and 
space. 
This paper has evaluated the cost of climate policy taking into 
account the possibility of delayed NA1-country participation to a binding 
climate agreement. Results show that a 30-year delay in NA1-country 
participation has a severe impact on global carbon emissions with 
significant implications for climate policy costs. Our estimate of the 
additional cost imposed by delayed NA1-country participation is between 
10 and 25 trillion USD. This negative effect wanes when non-participatory 18 
 
countries are allowed to trade emission reductions from their BaU 
emissions. Therefore, the optimal solution would be to establish a global 
carbon market even without binding emissions targets for NA1 countries, a 
suggestion in line with the existing literature on international agreements 
(Cf. Weyant and Hill 1999).  
Technology deployment is also affected by the time of participation 
to the carbon market. We find that delayed participation of NA1 countries to 
the carbon market would jeopardize the large scale diffusion of carbon 
capture and sequestration technologies. On the other hand, technology 
innovation via energy R&D would be positively affected because of the 
urgent need in developed countries. Finally, uncertainty about the time of 
participation of NA1 countries does not seem to modify the optimal 
abatement strategy in A1 countries and the cost of climate policy as long as 
a global carbon market is in place. 
Although our results are robust to different assumptions on the rate 
and timing of participation, a number of further improvements to our 
analysis would be useful. First, we have not considered mitigation options in 
the agro-forestry sector. In a previous paper (Tavoni et al. 2007) we showed 
that they could contribute to reducing global costs of climate policy. Given 
the importance and the timing of avoided deforestation, including it in the 
analysis would likely reinforce the argument in favour of a global carbon 
market. Second, carbon trading could occur even in the absence of a global 
carbon market, for example via trade of carbon intensive or bio-energy 
goods. Such effects are probably secondary when compared to the large 
flows registered in the international carbon market, but could lead to 
important terms-of-trade effects (McKibbin at al., 1999) as well as 
“secondary costs” associated with pre-existing distortions and market 
imperfections (Babiker et al., 2004). These effects are not yet included in 
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